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Abstract Singular wh-questions carry a uniqueness presupposition. Dayal (1996)
proposed that uniqueness is triggered by an answer operator (ANS), which occurs
highest in the question LF, outside the question nucleus. We observe data which
we take to show that uniqueness may be triggered at a low scope site, beneath
operators which themselves are within the question nucleus. In response to these
“low uniqueness” cases, we remove the uniqueness presupposition from ANS,
and suggest re-localizing it to the wh itself, which can reconstruct into the question
nucleus to take narrow scope. This paves the way for a weakening of ANS previously
suggested in Fox 2013 to accommodate mention-some questions.
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1 Introduction
Singular wh-questions carry a uniqueness presupposition (e.g. Higginbotham & May
1981; Dayal 1996). The question in (1a) presupposes (1b): that exactly one letter is
missing. What is the source of the presupposition?
(1) a. Which letter is missing?
b. ∃!x [letter(x) ∧ missing(x)]
Dayal (1996) proposed that uniqueness comes from an answer operator, ANS,
which occurs highest in the question LF, outside the question nucleus. ANS applies
to the question’s extension, a set of possible answers, and introduces a presupposition
which requires in the case of singular questions that the set contain exactly one true
member. We refer to Dayal’s approach as globalist: uniqueness is sourced to an
operator applying to the question as a whole.
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There is another possibility, however. Uniqueness might come from an operator
lower in the LF, within the question nucleus. In that case, each individual answer to
the question would carry a uniqueness presupposition, which would project globally.
We refer to this alternative hypothesis as localist. Our aim is to tease apart the two
possibilities, building a case for the localist view.
Our argument will involve scope. We present data which we take to instantiate
the configuration in (2). The uniqueness presupposition is introduced at a low scope
site (indicated with ∃!), beneath an operator (Op) which itself is within the question
nucleus. If so, the uniqueness trigger must occur within the nucleus, as well. The
configuration in (2) is out of the reach of the globalist view. Because the ANS
operator must be highest in the question LF to be interpreted, it necessarily takes
scope over all operators within the nucleus.
(2) [CP [T P ... Op ... ∃! ...]]
We build a composition where the source of uniqueness is the wh item itself,
which reconstructs from its surface position into the question nucleus. Op in our
configuration in (2) will be above the launching site of wh-movement and, as such,
reconstruction can yield uniqueness at an appropriately low site. Reconstruction of
the wh-phrase was argued to be possible in Rullmann & Beck 1998, and the idea that
the wh might be the source of uniqueness was considered in Champollion, Ciardelli
& Roelofsen 2017 and Uegaki 2018, 2019.
By motivating a localist view, our results relieve ANS of the burden to derive
uniqueness. Dayal’s ANS couples the triggering of a uniqueness presupposition
with deriving a strong notion of what counts as a complete answer to a question, one
which requires every question to have a unique complete answer. That notion is too
strong for mention-some questions, which allow for multiple complete answers. The
localist view paves the way for a weaker semantics for ANS, considered in Fox 2013
to accommodate mention-some.
2 Uniqueness from ANS
As a point of departure, we spell out in detail Dayal’s globalist theory deriving
uniqueness from ANS. A skeletal LF for (1a) is provided in (3).
(3) [ANS [CP which letter λ1 C [T P t1 is missing]]]
The CP denotes (the characteristic function for) a Hamblin set containing those
propositions which result from assigning to the wh-phrase’s trace position different
values given by the wh’s restrictor. Assuming that a singular NP denotes a property
which holds only of atomic entities, the function in (4a) (at the evaluation world w)
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characterizes the set in (4b). To facilitate exposition, we will routinely conflate a
question’s extension with the set it characterizes.
(4) a. JCPK = λp. ∃x [letter(x)(w) ∧ p = missing(x)]
b. JCPK ≈ {missing(a), missing(b), . . . }
Dayal’s ANS operator, defined in (5), applies to the Hamblin set, and introduces the
presupposition that it contain a strongest, or maximally informative, true proposition,
that is, a proposition that is true and entails any other proposition that is true. Any set
contains at most one such maximally informative true member. If the presupposition
is met, the structure headed by ANS denotes this member.
(5) JANSK = λQst,t. λw : ∃p [p(w) ∧ p∈Q ∧ ∀q [q(w) ∧ q∈Q→ p⊆q]]
. ιp [p(w) ∧ p∈Q ∧ ∀q [q(w) ∧ q∈Q→ p⊆q]]
The LF in (3), then, presupposes that (4) contain a maximally informative true
member. Importantly, the propositions in (4) are all logically independent of one
another. For a set of propositions that are not related by entailment, the existence of
a maximally informative true member is tantamount to the existence of a unique true
member, as shown in (6a) (for a world w). In turn, (6a) amounts to (6b) and, in this
way, Dayal derives the target uniqueness presupposition.
(6) a. ∃!p [p(w) ∧ p ∈ {missing(a), missing(b), . . . }]
b. ∃!x [letter(x)(w) ∧ missing(x)(w)]
At the same time, uniqueness presuppositions are absent with plural wh-questions
and questions whose wh lacks an overt restrictor (e.g. what). Dayal predicts that
pattern, as well. Consider (7). Whereas which letter in (1a) ranges just over atomic
entities, Dayal assumes that what ranges over both atomic entities — say individual
letters — and the plural entities constituted by their mereological sums (Link 1983).
As a result, (7) is associated with the Hamblin set in (8). Due to the distributivity
of missing, which guarantees the equivalence of missing(x+y) with missing(x) ∧
missing(y), this set is closed under conjunction.
(7) What is missing?
(8) {missing(a), missing(b), missing(a+b), . . . }
For a Hamblin set closed under conjunction, the existence of a maximally informative
true member is guaranteed so long as there are one or more true members. The
presupposition that ANS triggers is therefore tantamount to (9a) (in a world w).
Since (9a) amounts to (9b), a mere existence presupposition, that there is at least one
missing letter, is correctly derived for (7).
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(9) a. ∃p [p(w) ∧ p ∈ {missing(a), missing(b), missing(a+b), . . . }]
b. ∃x [letter(x)(w) ∧ missing(x)(w)]
Although Dayal’s system makes powerful predictions, we will argue that the
globalist derivation does not always correctly predict a question’s presupposition.
The localist system we propose aims to preserve the virtues of Dayal’s, while
also accounting for data problematic for global triggering. Before turning to our
argument, we note two challenges to Dayal’s system from prior literature.
2.1 Prior challenge 1: mention-some
The first challenge, raised by Fox (2013), targets the proposed coupling of the
presupposition with a characterization of answerhood. On Dayal’s analysis, the
uniqueness presupposition is a side effect of ANS’s characterization of a question’s
complete true answer as the strongest true proposition in the Hamblin set. But, this
notion of a complete answer is known not to be viable in general.
By Dayal’s notion of answerhood, every question must have a unique complete
true answer. That is appropriate for singular which-question like (1a), which can
have exactly one true answer, and certain non-singular questions, which receive a
“mention-all” interpretation, as is most natural for (7). If a and b are missing in w,
a true answer to (7) is intuitively complete only if it conveys that both a and b are
missing. Thus, the only answer that is judged complete is (10a). (10b) and (10c) are
merely partial answers. This is captured by ANS, since the proposition it outputs,
the strongest true answer in (8), will be missing(a+b).
(10) What is missing?
a. A and b are missing. (complete at w)
b. A is missing. (partial at w)
c. B is missing. (partial at w)
However, there are also “mention-some” questions, which allow for multiple
complete answers in the same world. Mention-some readings emerge in modalized
questions, such as (11). Intuitively, (11) can be interpreted as asking the responder
to name just one place we can get gas. Suppose that the places to get gas in w are
Texaco and Shell. The question, then, can be completely resolved equally well with
either the answer in (11a) or the one in (11b).
(11) Where can we get gas?
a. We can get gas at Texaco. (complete at w)
b. We can get gas at Shell. (complete at w)
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Dayal’s ANS does not yield the required result. Consider the Hamblin set
in (12). Assuming we do not get gas at multiple places at any accessible world,
propositions formed from pluralities, like ♦(gas(Texaco+Shell)), will be false. The
remaining propositions are all logically independent of one another and, as such,
ANS’s presupposition imposes a uniqueness requirement, just as it did in (1a). When
the presupposition is met (which it is not in w), ANS will return the unique true
element of (12) as the sole complete answer to the question.
(12) {♦(gas(Texaco)), ♦(gas(Shell)), ♦(gas(Texaco+Shell)), ...}
Another possibility is that a distributivity operator is inserted into the structure at a
scope site above can. Since distributing Texaco+Shell over can yields the proposition
(♦(gas(Texaco)) ∧ ♦(gas(Shell))), the Hamblin set is then (13), rather than (12). This
set is closed under conjunction, and ANS would yield an existence presupposition
and a mention-all reading, like in (7). The strongest true proposition in (13) is
(♦(gas(Texaco)) ∧ ♦(gas(Shell))), and ANS would output that proposition, the one
conveying all the places we can get gas.1
(13) {♦(gas(Texaco)), ♦(gas(Shell)), ♦(gas(Texaco)) ∧ ♦(gas(Shell)), ...}
Hence, Dayal’s system predicts either uniqueness or mention-all for (11). The
optionality between complete answers characteristic of mention-some is not derived.
We return to the topic of answerhood and mention-some in Section 5.
2.2 Prior challenge 2: projection
Uegaki (2018, 2019) considers how the uniqueness presupposition projects when the
question is embedded under a non-veridical predicate. He observes that uniqueness
interacts with the predicate. The sentence in (14) globally presupposes not that there
is exactly one missing letter, but that Max believes there is.
1 There are other derivations which converge. Spector (2008) proposed that wh-phrases can optionally
range over quantifiers, instead of entities, and leave quantifier-type traces. Xiang (2016) raises,
among other parses, a derivation for (11) with a quantifier-type trace below the modal, as in (i).
Suppose the restrictor of where includes not only the Montague lift of the entities given by Texaco
and Shell, but also disjunctive quantifiers such as Texaco or Shell. In the corresponding Hamblin
answer, the disjunction takes scope beneath the modal, at the trace position (t2). Xiang proposes that
a covert operator, indicated here as EXH, can derive free choice strengthening of ♦(gas(Texaco) ∨
gas(Shell)) to (♦(gas(Texaco)) ∧ ♦(gas(Shell))) — closing the Hamblin set under conjunction. We
will in general set aside parses with higher-order quantification. As far as we know, the existence of
such parses would not impact our main arguments (but see fn. 7).
(i) [CP where λ2 C [EXH [T P can [t2;est,st λ1 [vP we get gas (at) t1;e]]]]]
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(14) Max is certain about which letter is missing.
In a straightforward extension of Dayal’s system to (14), the ANS operator would
be interpreted relative to the matrix evaluation world w, so that (14) conveys that in
every w’ compatible with what Max is certain about in w, the actual answer to the
embedded question in w is true in w’. In addition to deriving a problematic veridical
assertion,2 with the world argument of ANS free, its presuppositions should project
to the matrix level, unaffected by the modal. To solve the projection problem, Uegaki
proposes that uniqueness is carried not by ANS, but by the individual Hamblin
answers. Projection in (14) then unifies with (15), where the question is replaced
with one of its answers, and the global presupposition is, again, that Max believes
exactly one letter is missing. Our proposal will share with Uegaki’s the feature that
uniqueness is carried by each individual Hamblin answer.
(15) Max is certain that the missing letter is a.
3 Low uniqueness
Adding to the challenges for ANS in (5), we now present the core data which we
take to instantiate the scope configuration in (16). Since Op is within the question
nucleus, and uniqueness is triggered beneath Op, the uniqueness trigger must be low,
within the nucleus, as well. Since ANS operates on the question’s Hamblin set, it
cannot take scope within the nucleus, hence cannot scope below Op. ANS cannot be
the source of low uniqueness, nor can other global operators.3
(16) [CP [T P ... Op ... ∃! ...]]
3.1 High uniqueness is not obligatory
In our data, Op is an existential quantifier expressed by a possibility modal. In (17),
the infinitival to make a word ensures that could receives a teleological interpretation,
and provides an overt domain restrictor, so that could existentially quantifies over
worlds where the goal of making a word is achieved.
2 If ANS’s world argument were bound by certain (co-bound with the world argument of the structure
headed by ANS, here [ANS [which letter is missing]]), a trivial reading would result: that in every w’
compatible with what Max is certain about in w, the answer to the question that is true in w’ is true in
w’. To derive the correct assertion, Uegaki (2018: Sec. 4.1) modifies the argument structure of ANS.
Our main focus is matrix questions, so we will suppress his revision here.
3 Uegaki (2018) entertains the idea that an operator which is below ANS, but still outside the question
nucleus, applies to the Hamblin set, and outputs a new set, which is like the input, but with each
answer carrying a uniqueness presupposition. Low uniqueness counters that possibility: each answer
must carry uniqueness by virtue of the presupposition being triggered within the nucleus.
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(17) Which letter could we add to make a word?
What is (17) predicted to presuppose? On the globalist account, uniqueness is
triggered above the modal. (17) has the LF in (18), and the Hamblin set in (19),
with each proposition modalized. As in (1a), the members of the Hamblin set are
logically independent, and the presupposition triggered by ANS requires that exactly
one of the answers be true in the evaluation world w, as in (20a). This amounts to
(20b): that there exists exactly one letter that could be added to form a word. We
refer to (20b) as a high uniqueness presupposition.
(18) [ANS [CP which letter could we add]]
(19) {♦(add(a)), ♦(add(b)), ...}
(20) a. ∃!p [p(w) ∧ p ∈ {♦(add(a)), ♦(add(b)), . . . }]
b. ∃!x [letter(x)(w) ∧ ♦w(add(x))] (high uniqueness)
It seems that (17) can indeed be understood in this way. However, (17) does not
pattern as though it obligatorily presupposes high uniqueness. Suppose, for example,
that (17) occurs in the context in (21), which provides a word skeleton that sets the
implicit argument for add in (18). The skeleton fo m contains a single blank that
must be filled to create a word. In this context, the high uniqueness presupposition
fails at the actual world. There are, in fact, two letters that could be added. We could
fill in the blank with a to create the word foam, or r to create form. Correspondingly,
the Hamblin set in (19) contains two true members — ♦(add(a)) and ♦(add(r)) —
contrary to the presupposition. Yet, (17) still seems perfectly natural.
(21) The skeleton is fo m.
As confirmation, we observe, first, that (17) can felicitously receive an answer
incompatible with the presupposition. Repeated as (A) in (22), (17) can be answered
with the disjunction in (B), under a free choice interpretation. That is, (B) can convey
that each of a and r is a possible addition to create a word.
(22) A: Which letter could we add to make a word?
B: A or r.
One might wonder whether the felicity of (B) is actually compatible with (17)
presupposing (20), after all. Conceivably, it could be that the questioner in (A)
does intend to presuppose high uniqueness, and that the responder offers (B) as a
felicitous presupposition denial. However, this proposal depends on a satisfactory
explanation for the contrast between (22) and the control in (23).
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(23) A: Which letter is missing in this word?
B: #A and r.
The response in (23B) is to be read with neutral prosody, parallel to the natural
prosodic realization of (22B). With such a prosody, (23B) is infelicitous. That is
as it should be, given that (23B) contradicts the uniqueness presupposition attested
for (23A), that exactly one letter is missing. If (23B) cannot felicitously deny the
uniqueness presupposition of (23A), it is unclear why (22B) would be able to serve
as a presupposition denial either.
We can also change the example to further mitigate any confound from the
possibility of presupposition denial. In (24), the questioner herself offers a follow-up
which makes clear that she does not intend to presuppose high uniqueness, and that
is felicitous, as well. For good measure, we can show independently that a questioner
cannot in general contradict her own uniqueness presupposition: (25) is infelicitous,
since the follow-up contradicts the attested presupposition that exactly one letter is
missing. We conclude that (17) need not presuppose high uniqueness.
(24) Which letter could we add to make a word? A is one. Others?
(25) #Which letter is missing in this word? A is. Others?
3.2 Diagnosing low uniqueness
We observe that there is still a kind of uniqueness associated with (17). To bring out
the effect, suppose that the context is modified as in (26), so that the word skeleton
contains two blanks, instead of one. Assuming that the question is asking about
letter tokens, it registers as sharply deviant in the revised context.
(26) (The skeleton is f m.)
#Which letter (token) could we add to make a word?
Even if the question does not presuppose that there is exactly one letter we could add
to make a word, it still presupposes that we could make a word by adding exactly
one letter. Intuitively, the infelicity in (26) is due to the context establishing that
more than one letter must be added.
As we will show in detail in the next section, the observed presupposition is
expected if uniqueness is triggered locally, within the modal’s scope. Since the
triggered presupposition excludes the modal, it has the content in (27a) (at a world
w): that we add exactly one letter. Assuming that the triggered presupposition
projects existentially through the possibility modal, the global presupposition is
(27b): that, at some accessible world where we make a word, we add exactly one
letter. Comparing (27b) to the high presupposition in (20b), the relative scope of
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uniqueness and the modal are reversed. Whereas ∃! scopes over the modal in (20b),
the modal takes wide scope over ∃! in (27b). Accordingly, we refer to (27b) as the
low uniqueness presupposition.
(27) a. ♦w∃!x [letter(x)(w) ∧ add(x)(w)] (triggered)
b. ♦w∃!x [letter(x) ∧ add(x)] (projected; low uniqueness)
Assuming that a word skeleton is invariant across accessible worlds, once the
word skeleton is set, the number of letters we add is uniform across all worlds where
we make a word. With fo m, we add exactly one letter in all word-worlds, and
the possibility requirement in (27b) is satisfied (indeed, even a stronger necessity
requirement would be satisfied). With f m, there are no word-worlds where we
add exactly one letter, and (27b) fails. Low uniqueness makes the right cut between
contexts where the modalized question is and is not felicitous.
The low uniqueness effect is not tied to the presence of root modality. This is
illustrated by the contrast in (28). (28a) has a felicitous interpretation where could is
read as epistemic and thus asks about letters that, in view of the available evidence,
could be missing. Intuitively, (28a) is compatible with there being multiple epistemic
possibilities for the missing letter, indicating that a high uniqueness presupposition
is not obligatory. Still, low uniqueness is again detectable in (28b).
(28) a. Which letter could be missing in fo m?
b. #Which letter could be missing in f m?
In sum, we conclude that the uniqueness presupposition that Dayal’s globalist
account derives for singular which-questions is not always attested. When absent, it
is supplanted by a uniqueness presupposition that is locally triggered and projected.
The source of uniqueness, then, must be some scopally mobile element within the
question nucleus. But, what is the localist trigger?
4 Uniqueness from which
Wh-phrases surface high in the left periphery. Do they also have to take scope at this
high site? Rullmann & Beck (1998) study cases where a wh-phrase extracts from an
intensional context, and observe that in such cases, the wh-phrase’s restrictor can be
interpreted as being evaluated in worlds quantified over by the intensional operator.
The question in (29), for example, need not be understood as asking about actual
unicorns. Instead, (29) allows for a more natural interpretation on which felicitous
answers identify entities that are unicorns in Bill’s belief-worlds.
(29) (Bill thought he saw two unicorns, a green one and a blue one.)
Which unicorn did Bill want to catch?
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Rullmann & Beck conclude that a wh-phrase’s restrictor takes scope under another
operator in virtue of the whole wh-phrase taking narrow scope. If wh-phrases have
mobile scope, which has the right profile to be the uniqueness trigger, and we present
an analysis in that vein. We tie low scope uniqueness to low scope for which.
4.1 Step 1: uniqueness in basic data
Our lexical entry for which is stated in (30). Which composes with an entity, and
two properties. Which is accordingly what Hackl (2000) calls a parameterized
determiner. Its assertive component returns truth in case the individual given by the
first input has the properties given by the other two inputs. The entry in addition
features a definedness condition that encodes a presupposition: that there is exactly
one individual that satisfies both input properties.
(30) JwhichK
= λx . λ fe,st . λge,st . λw : ∃!y [f(y)(w) ∧ g(y)(w)] . f(x)(w) ∧ g(x)(w)
The basic question in (31a) is derived as in (31b). A covert question forming
operator, ?, originates as the first argument of which, and moves to take widest scope,
leaving a type e trace. Which (t) letter also moves to a peripheral position in the
narrow syntax, but can reconstruct into the question nucleus at LF. For concreteness,
we show reconstruction to the specifier of TP. The restrictor and scope arguments
for which effectively correspond to letter and is missing, respectively.
(31) a. Which letter is missing?
b. [CP ? λ1 [T P [DP [which t1] letter] λ2 [vP t2 is missing]]]
At the TP-level, which triggers the presupposition that there is exactly one entity that
satisfies both letter and is missing, as underlined in (32). This is precisely the target
presupposition that exactly one letter is missing. Now, the question remains: how
does the presupposition project?
(32) JTPKg = JwhichK(g(1))(JletterK)(Jis missingK) =
λw : ∃!y [letter(y)(w) ∧ miss(y)(w)] . letter(g(1))(w) ∧ miss(g(1))(w)
The TP asserts that the entity given by the trace of ? is a missing letter. ? has
the denotation in (33), and binds its trace to output as the denotation of the CP the
function in (34), characterizing the Hamblin set in (35). Each answer carries the
presupposition that exactly one letter is missing, and asserts that some particular
entity is a missing letter, with that entity differing between answers.
(33) J?K = λ fe,st. λpst. ∃x [p = f(x)]
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(34) λp. ∃x [p = λw : ∃!y [letter(y)(w)∧miss(y)(w)] . letter(x)(w)∧miss(x)(w)]
(35)

λw : ∃!y [letter(y)(w) ∧ miss(y)(w)] . letter(a)(w) ∧ miss(a)(w),
λw : ∃!y [letter(y)(w) ∧ miss(y)(w)] . letter(b)(w) ∧ miss(b)(w),
. . .

We can show independently that a presupposition carried by each answer in a
Hamblin set projects to become a presupposition of the question as a whole. For
example, due to the definite description in the question nucleus, each answer to (36)
will presuppose that France has a unique king, and this presupposition is intuited to
be associated with the question. Given the Hamblin denotation in (34), we therefore
arrive at the intended prediction: that (31) globally presupposes uniqueness.
(36) Who invited the king of France?
For basic data, the localist approach predicts the same overall presupposition as a
globalist approach would — but through a different compositional path. While ANS
would trigger the presupposition by operating on the Hamblin set, which triggers it
within each Hamblin answer, and it projects from there.
4.2 Step 2: low uniqueness = low scope which
The two approaches come apart when an additional scope operator occurs in the
question nucleus, as in our test data, the core case repeated in (37).
(37) Which letter could we add to make a word?
While ANS introduced uniqueness at a fixed scope site above the modal, the wh-
phrase can reconstruct to different positions in the question nucleus, leading to
observed scope variability. We assume that when which letter moves in the narrow
syntax it makes an intermediate landing (at least) at the edge of the local vP before
raising to spec-TP and, finally, to its surface position in the periphery. In turn, which
letter can reconstruct to spec-TP, above could, or to the edge of the vP, below could.
The two options are sketched in (38) and (39), respectively.
(38) LF1: which > could
[CP ? λ1 [T P [DP which t1 letter] λ3 [T P could [vP t3 λ2 [vP we add t2]]]]
(39) LF2: could > which
[CP ? λ1 [T P could [vP [DP which t1 letter] λ2 [vP we add t2]]]]
LF1 yields the same high uniqueness reading derived with ANS, where it is globally
presupposed that there is exactly one letter that we could add to make a word. It is
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the second parse, LF2, that furnishes a new reading: low uniqueness.
The vP structure in LF2 carries the presupposition in (40a). Assuming, again,
that the presupposition projects existentially through the possibility modal, the TP
presupposes (40b): that we could make a word by adding exactly one letter. That
presupposition is, in turn, carried by each proposition in the Hamblin set that the
CP expresses, as shown in (41), and projects globally. Because (40b) is precisely
the low uniqueness presupposition that we identified for (37) in the last section, the
analysis achieves empirical adequacy.
(40) a. ♦w∃!y [letter(y)(w) ∧ add(y)(w)] (triggered at vP)
b. ♦w∃!y [letter(y) ∧ add(y)] (projected to TP)
(41)

λw : ♦w∃!y [letter(y) ∧ add(y)] . ♦w(letter(a) ∧ add(a)),
λw : ♦w∃!y [letter(y) ∧ add(y)] . ♦w(letter(b) ∧ add(b)),
. . .

4.3 Comparison with Dayal
The lexical entry for which in (30) requires a small update to generalize beyond
data with a singular NP to data with a plural, as in (42). As discussed in Section
2, non-singular questions do not presuppose uniqueness, but rather carry a simple
existence presupposition, here that some letter is missing.
(42) Which letters are missing?
With which defined as in (30), (42) is predicted to presuppose that there is exactly
one entity which satisfies both letters and is missing. If letter holds of atomic letters,
the plural letters would hold of both atomic letters, and plural entities with letters
as atomic parts. If there are two letters missing, a and b, the entities that satisfy
letters include a, b, and the plurality a+b, all of which would (distributively) satisfy
is missing, as well. Accordingly, while (42) intuitively allows for multiple missing
letters, the presupposition of which fails in that case.
We can address this problem by adapting Sharvy’s (1980) classic semantics for
singular and plural definite descriptions. That is, in our entry for which in (30) above,
we can revise the presupposition as in (43). Instead of demanding the existence of a
unique entity that has the two properties, the revised condition merely requires that
there by a maximal entity that has those properties, that is, an entity which has those
properties and which contains all other entities that do.
(43) JwhichK
= λx . λ fest . λgest . λw : ∃y [f(y)(w) ∧ g(y)(w) ∧ ∀z[f(z)(w) ∧ g(z)(w)→ z≤y]]
= λx . λ fest . λgest . λ .. . f(x)(w) ∧ g(x)(w)
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For cases where the conjunction of the two properties can only hold of atomic
entities, as guaranteed by singular marking on letter in our initial examples, the
revised condition replicates the intended uniqueness presupposition. At the same
time, in cases where the conjunction of the two properties is closed under sum
formation, as in the plural example (42), the revised condition has the effect of
merely deriving a presupposition of existence. If the missing letters are a and b, the
maximal entity which has the properties letters and is missing is the plurality a+b,
and the revised presupposition is satisfied.
Our account, then, mirror’s Dayal’s globalist account in invoking maximality
in the presupposition associated with singular and plural which questions. On the
globalist account, maximality is based on an ordering of propositions in terms of
logical strength. In our account, the ordering is the mereological part-whole relation
between entities. Our system thus preserves the advantages of Dayal’s, predicting
uniqueness in singular which questions, and mere existence in non-singular data.
By localizing maximality in which, we furthermore allow for maximality to be
introduced at different scopes sites, as required for low uniqueness.
Our analysis for which would extend to what, at least when it occurs with an overt
restrictor, as uniqueness effects again arise (e.g. What letter is missing?). In general,
the null hypothesis is that the denotation for which is common to all wh-items, each
encoding a maximality presupposition. When an overt restrictor is not present, a
covert non-singular NP would furnish the first property argument.
5 Consequences for answerhood
We now consider consequences of our results for the lexical semantics of ANS and,
relatedly, the notion of what counts as a complete answer to a question. If present
in the structure, ANS must not trigger uniqueness. Fox (2013) proposes that ANS
regulates whether a question receives a mention-all or mention-some interpretation.
He offers a different notion of answerhood from Dayal’s — one which allows some
questions to have multiple complete answers — and weakens ANS in kind. One
statement of ANS which Fox considers revises the operator in such a way that it
does no longer trigger uniqueness. While Fox took failure to derive uniqueness to
be a problem for the analysis, our results support such a formulation. Combining
our system with Fox’s ANS yields correct predictions about the distribution of
mention-some readings with singular which questions.
5.1 Weakening ANS
As discussed in Section 2, Dayal took every licit question to have a unique complete
answer, corresponding to the Hamblin set’s strongest true element. What we refer to
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now as ANSD presupposed that such an element exists, and returned that element.
Fox (2013) considers a weaker formulation of ANS, provided in (44).
(44) JANSFK = λQ . λw : ∃p [p(w) ∧ p∈Q ∧ ¬∃p’∈Q[p’(w) ∧ p’∈Q ∧ p’⊂p]JANSFK = λQ . λw . {p : p(w) ∧ p∈Q ∧ ¬∃p’∈Q[p’(w) ∧ p’∈Q ∧ p’⊂p]}
ANSF presupposes that the Hamblin set contain one or more propositions which are
true and not entailed by an other true proposition. ANSF returns the set of all such
propositions, and any element of the ANS-set counts as a complete answer to the
question. Depending on the logical make-up of the Hamblin set, the ANS-set may
have necessarily one member, or allow for multiple members. In the latter case, a
mention-some reading results.
For a Hamblin set closed under conjunction, ANSF derives a mention-all reading,
just as ANSD did. Consider the question in (45), along with its classical Hamblin set
in (46), which repeat (7) and (8). With the set closed under conjunction, if there is
any true answer, there is necessarily a unique strongest true answer. That answer will
also be the only true answer that is not entailed by any other true answer. Whereas
ANSD returned the strongest true answer itself, ANSF will return the singleton set
containing it. If, at w, a and b are missing, ANSF will output the set in (47).
(45) What is missing?
(46) {missing(a), missing(b), missing(a+b), . . . }
(47) JANSFK((46))(w) = {missing(a+b)}
The move to ANSF has crucial consequences when the Hamblin set is not closed
under conjunction, and contains mutually compatible propositions. This is the case
for (48) with the Hamblin set in (49), which repeat (11) and (12). Assuming as before
that we will only get gas at a single place, and that Texaco and Shell are available
at w, the first two propositions in (49) are both true. Being logically independent,
they are, moreover, both true propositions not entailed by any other true proposition.
While the maximality presupposition of ANSD would fail, the weaker presupposition
of ANSF is satisfied, and ANSF returns the set of both propositions in (50), either
of which constitutes a complete answer to the question. With multiple complete
answers, (48) is correctly predicted to pattern as mention-some.
(48) Where can we get gas?
(49) {♦(gas(Texaco)), ♦(gas(Shell)), ♦(gas(Texaco+Shell)), ...}
(50) JANSFK((49))(w) = {♦(gas(Texaco), ♦(gas(Shell))}
In this way, Fox’s proposal derives both mention-all and mention-some readings,
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and makes predictions about their respective distribution. It predicts, for instance,
that a non-modalized question (with a non-singular wh-phrase), like (45), should
only permit a mention-all reading. George (2011) noted that this is the case, and Fox
extended his observations with the minimal pair in (51). (51b), but not (51a), can
ask the responder to name one place that now has gas.
(51) (A truck delivered gas to five local gas stations.)
a. Where did he deliver gas? (MA, *MS)
b. Where can we get gas? (MA, MS)
Quantitative data in Xiang & Cremers (2017) further substantiate a contrast in the
availability of mention-some between non-modalized and modalized questions, and
Xiang (2016) provides additional arguments that the contrast between mention-all
and mention-some readings should be regulated by a grammatical operator.
5.2 Fox’s dilemma
Now, what does the re-formulated ANS predict for basic singular which questions? In
combination with a classical analysis, where which does not itself encode uniqueness,
ANSF predicts no uniqueness at all. Consider (52) and its classical Hamblin set
(53), repeating (3) and (4b) from Section 2. Like (49), (53) is not closed under
conjunction, and contains multiple mutually compatible elements. Assuming the
word is form, with o and r missing, there are two true propositions at w: miss(o) and
miss(r). These are logically independent of one another, so both are true and not
entailed by any other true proposition. The presupposition of ANSF is met, and the
doubleton containing both is output in (54).
(52) Which letter is missing?
(53) {missing(a), missing(b), . . . }
(54) JANSFK((53))(w) = {missing(o), missing(r)}
In precisely the sort of case where (52) should suffer from failure of its uniqueness
presupposition, the presupposition of ANSF is met, and the question is predicted to
pattern as mention-some, answerable with either proposition in (54).
ANSD predicted uniqueness in (52), but also wrongly predicted uniqueness
(or mention-all) for (48). ANSF derives mention-some in both, wrongly for (52).
Accepting the premise that ANS should be the source of uniqueness, Fox (2013,
2018) and Xiang (2016) suggest further modifications to ANS to derive uniqueness
in (52), while still predicting mention-some in (48). Our analysis, on the other
hand, denies the premise. By re-sourcing uniqueness away from ANS, ANSF can be
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maintained, and uniqueness still derived in (52).
In Section 4, we replaced the Hamblin set in (53) with (55) which, most crucially,
adds to each proposition in the set a uniqueness presupposition from which. With the
presupposition projected globally,4 while the Hamblin set is still not closed under
conjunction, the propositions it contains are rendered mutually exclusive.
(55)

λw : ∃!y [letter(y)(w) ∧ miss(y)(w)]. letter(a)(w) ∧ miss(a)(w),
λw : ∃!y [letter(y)(w) ∧ miss(y)(w)]. letter(b)(w) ∧ miss(b)(w),
. . .

With two letters missing in form, the uniqueness presupposition from which fails,
ruling out the question. By contrast, if there is just a single missing letter, the
uniqueness presupposition is satisfied, and there is just one true proposition in the
Hamblin set. That proposition is trivially not entailed by any other true proposition,
so the presupposition of ANSF is satisfied in kind. ANSF returns the singleton set
containing the true proposition, as in (56), if the word is form.
(56) JANSFK((55))(w)
= {λw : ∃!y [letter(y)(w) ∧ miss(y)(w)] . letter(r)(w) ∧ miss(r)(w)}
Hence, the prediction that singular which questions should pattern as mention-some
is avoided. In contexts where the question is permissible according to its uniqueness
presupposition, there is one true Hamblin answer, and ANSF returns the singleton
set thereof, identifying that answer as the sole complete true one.5
5.3 Where mention-some is observed
So far, we have shown that combining ANSF with a separate uniqueness trigger in
which avoids over-generating mention-some in basic singular which-questions. At
the same time, with the identification of low uniqueness comes a further prediction,
that there should be singular which-questions which actually do allow for mention-
4 The adoption of ANSF has a further welcome effect within the context of our analysis: it accounts for
the observation, exploited in Section 4, that a presupposition that is carried by all Hamblin answers
projects as a presupposition of the question as a whole. This is because in virtue of demanding that
one or more Hamblin answers be true, the presupposition triggered by ANSF also demands that the
presupposition of one or more Hamblin answers be met.
5 Introducing a maximality presupposition into where would not affect mention-some in (48). Where
would be parsed with a covert non-singular NP (≈ what places) and, as such, maximality would
introduce a mere existence presupposition. Scoping what NP over can would yield a presupposition
that there is some place we can get gas. Scope under can would yield a triggered presupposition
that we get gas somewhere, projecting that we can get gas somewhere (equivalent to the high
presupposition, if the NP is interpreted relative to the evaluation world). Either way, the presupposition
is compatible with there being multiple places we can get gas, allowing for mention-some.
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some: modalized questions on their low uniqueness reading. Repeating (37) and
(41) from Section 4, our low uniqueness prototype is shown again in (57), along
with the Hamblin set for the LF with which taking scope under could, in (58).
(57) Which letter could we add to make a word?
(58)

λw : ♦w∃!y [letter(y) ∧ add(y)] . ♦w(letter(a) ∧ add(a)),
λw : ♦w∃!y [letter(y) ∧ add(y)] . ♦w(letter(b) ∧ add(b)),
. . .

While the uniqueness presupposition in the basic case in (55) renders the elements
of the Hamblin set mutually exclusive, the projected low uniqueness presupposition
does not. It is presupposed that we could make a word by adding exactly one letter.
That is compatible with us being able to add a and us being able to add b, and so
forth. Any of the propositions in (58) could be true at once.
With the familiar skeleton, fo_m, where we could make a word by adding a or r,
the projected uniqueness presupposition is met, and there are two true propositions
in the Hamblin set. Since those are logically independent of one another, neither is
entailed by another true element of the Hamblin set. Accordingly, the presupposition




λw : ♦w∃!y [letter(y) ∧ add(y)] . ♦w(letter(a) ∧ add(a)),
λw : ♦w∃!y [letter(y) ∧ add(y)] . ♦w(letter(r) ∧ add(r))
}
In this way, given the Hamblin set in (58), (57) is predicted to have a mention-
some reading, where any true proposition in the Hamblin set counts as a complete
answer. Dayal (2016) suggests that modalized singular which questions do not allow
for mention-some. When low uniqueness is supported, however, a mention-some
reading does emerge, as we predict.6
Suppose that Mary is playing a game, where she is shown a word skeleton, and
will win a prize if she can make any word from the skeleton. Before the game, she
is told that there might be more than one way to make a word in some rounds. In
one round, the skeleton fo_m appears. It then seems felicitous for Mary to ask (57)
as a mention-some question, asking the responder to name some letter that could
be added to make a word. Consistent with the ANS-set in (59), the responder could
completely resolve the question by answering either (60a) or (60b).
(60) a. You could add a. (complete answer)
b. You could add r. (complete answer)
6 For a related observation, due to Roger Schwarzschild, see Dayal 2016: p. 75, fn. 19.
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In sum, ANSF , with variable scope uniqueness from which, correctly predicts
both that basic singular which-questions should disallow mention-some, and that low
uniqueness modalized questions should allow mention-some. In the former case,
but not the latter, the projected uniqueness presupposition renders elements of the
Hamblin set mutually exclusive.7
6 Conclusion
We have presented a localist analysis of the uniqueness presupposition of singular
wh-questions according to which the presupposition is not triggered by ANS, as in
Dayal’s (1996) globalist analysis, but by an operator within the question nucleus,
such as the wh itself. The analysis is motivated by low uniqueness readings, which
we attributed to reconstruction of the wh-phrase to a narrow scope site.
A number of issues remain open. First, constraints on the distribution of low
uniqueness readings merit study. Can uniqueness be introduced beneath operators
other than existential teleological and epistemic modals? If uniqueness comes from
the wh-item, constraints on low uniqueness should, all things equal, track constraints
on narrow scope for the wh-phrase. Moreover, multiple singular which-questions
merit study in light of our conclusions. Which student saw which professor? does
not presuppose that exactly one student saw exactly one professor, but rather that
each student saw exactly one professor. How is that derived if uniqueness is locally
triggered? We hope to take up these questions in future work.
7 While we have focused on mention-some, low uniqueness questions also seem to allow mention-all
readings. These are perhaps clearest with epistemic modals. Suppose that the rules of Mary’s game
are changed so that there is a particular word hidden under the skeleton, and Mary must guess the
right word to win. It then seems natural to ask (A) with the intention of soliciting all letters that could
be missing, as in (B), so Mary can entertain all options before guessing the word.
(i) A: Which letter could be missing in fo_m?
B: A or r.
To derive mention-all, low uniqueness questions must have a parse where which takes scope below
the modal, but the Hamblin set is closed under conjunction, unlike in Section 4. One possibility,
suggested in Xiang 2019, is that mention-all in our low uniqueness cases derives from a parse like
the one in fn. 1. Adapting Xiang’s proposal, ? (we assume optionally) quantifies over quantifiers
and leaves a quantifier-type trace under could, as in (ii). The domain of quantification includes,
for example, the Montague Lift of a and r and the disjunctive quantifier a or r. A covert operator
achieves free choice strengthening in the disjunctive answer from ♦(miss(a) ∨ miss(r)) to (♦(miss(a))
∧ ♦(miss(r))), yielding the mention-all answer. This derivation captures the fact that, in (i), the
mention-all answer is naturally expressed with a free choice disjunction.
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